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This slim volume, officially authored by Italian philosopher 
Paola Cavalieri, is actually a discussion among Cavalieri and 
four others: Cary Wolfe, Harlan Miller, Matthew Calarco, and 
John (J. M.) Coetzee. Cavalieri sets the agenda with a piece in 
dialogue form, “The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue on Per-
fectionism.” As Peter Singer points out in his Foreword, in ad-
dition to the issue of perfectionism, the book is concerned with 
the respective merits of analytic and continental approaches to 
animal ethics, and with whether reasoned argument plays the 
central role in ethical matters that many philosophers would 
like to believe. The exchanges among the participants are sharp 
and provocative.
Cavalieri rejects perfectionism: the idea of a hierarchy in 
moral status among sentient individuals based on the degree to 
which they possess certain cognitive skills (most commonly: 
self-consciousness, rationality, and language). She points out 
that although we no longer subscribe to perfectionism when 
it comes to human beings (who are all considered to possess 
“human rights” by virtue of mere intentionality), we regularly 
use it to judge the worth of nonhumans, with the abstraction 
“the animal” designating the bottom of the perfectionist hierar-
chy. Cavalieri also rejects the idea that we can have some cred-
ible way of judging the relative harm that death is to different 
sorts of individuals, based on their levels of mental complexity. 
(Given the widespread intuition that death is a greater harm to 
a normal human than to a dog—see Regan’s lifeboat case, for 
example—it would have been good to have someone in this 
volume at least play devil’s advocate on this one.)
While none of the participants is willing to defend perfec-
tionism, Cavalieri’s opening dialogue does unleash a somewhat 
heated exchange on analytic versus continental approaches to 
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animal ethics. Marx said, “The philosophers have only inter-
preted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” 
Analytic philosophers not only have placed animal ethics on 
the intellectual agenda, but also have played a major role in the 
founding and on-going development of the modern animal-lib-
eration movement. With respect to nonhuman animals, is con-
tinental philosophy only for interpreting the world in various 
ways, or can it make a real contribution to changing it? Calarco 
thinks it possible to adapt the insights of Emmanuel Levinas 
and others to make such a contribution.
Calarco criticizes as “metaphysical” the attempt by Cava-
lieri and other analytic philosophers to demarcate the moral 
community, to decide who’s in and what’s out. Instead, he ad-
vocates an “agnostic” ethics of universal consideration, open to 
the possibility that “anything might take on a face.” Cavalieri 
replies that mere moral considerability is not the issue here; 
rather, it is who is entitled to basic equality of treatment. If 
nonhuman animals are to be included with humans in the com-
munity of equals, then even for an ethics of universal consider-
ation there must be a criterion for access to equality.
The reliance of Cavalieri (and many other animal advocates) 
on the concept of rights comes under fire from Wolfe and Ca-
larco. Harlan Miller responds that it doesn’t matter whether we 
regard rights as natural or artificial: reflection on our moral at-
titudes toward members of the human family, combined with 
logical consistency, calls for expansion of the moral commu-
nity, and—here Miller makes a point made more than a century 
ago by Henry Salt—if humans have moral rights, then many 
animals do too. I would add that evolution has hard-wired us 
with moral sensibility; we need not demand insight into some 
absolute moral realm to know what is right and wrong for us, 
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and how we ought to treat others who are subjects of their own 
lives.
The contributions of novelist Coetzee are brief but pointed. 
He doubts that reason has played the key role in changing the 
attitudes to animals of the book’s participants. Rather, each is 
likely to have undergone a conversion experience involving 
a Levinas-like recognition of the existential autonomy of the 
Other, for which backing was then sought in the writings of 
thinkers and philosophers. Miller demurs, saying his conver-
sion was a purely intellectual matter of being convinced by the 
arguments of Singer and others.
Philosophers may hope to convince the public by force of ar-
gument, but Coetzee reminds us that much of that public values 
a life of reason less than a life of passion and appetite (“brawl-
ing and guzzling and fucking”). There is a joke that asks: How 
many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? Answer: 
Only one, but the light bulb has to want to change. It seems to 
me that reason can, and often does, play a crucial role in chang-
ing a person’s mind about animals—but only if the person is 
ready to change. In that case, especially for those more intellec-
tually inclined, reason can flip the switch that makes the light 
go on. Despite her work with chimpanzees, for many years Jane 
Goodall continued to eat meat; then she read Singer’s Animal 
Liberation, the light went on, and she stopped eating meat. The 
interesting question is what brings a person to the point where 
they are ready to change, brings them to the verge of saying, 
“Yes, this is what I should do; this is what I want.” That lengthy 
prologue is complex, and one in which reason is typically sub-
ordinate to the emotions. The young child who feels horror on 
learning where her meat comes from is reasoning, but the driv-
ing force is sympathy, without which reason is unlikely to gain 
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traction. (In the case of the child, this particular sympathy is 
likely soon to be suppressed or diverted, perhaps to resurface 
later in life.)
Philosophy has its place in the dialectic of reason and pas-
sion. Those interested in animal ethics have reason to read The 
Death of the Animal.
